

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**SECURITY ASSISTANCE – AN ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT**

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ABSTRACT

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Security assistance has long been recognized as a highly successful means of providing assistance to other militaries around the world while serving as a low key but very effective foreign policy tool. Often the programs of security assistance are among the most practical and visible signs of our support for and involvement with other nations and their military services. This interaction leads to improved understanding between nations, support for emerging democracies, effective military and civil contacts, and improved defense capabilities for our allies and friends. In the past, security assistance has been a significant element of the national security environment. As we assess the changes in our security environment, we must ask the question, "How should the United States of America use security assistance to help shape our national security environment of the future?" This paper recommends that the U.S. continues to use security assistance to serve U.S. national security interests. The engagement we achieve through our assistance, with governments and the broader society, is building strong ties that will help anchor U.S. relations with these countries for years to come. Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make a difference.

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In addition, if we can build trust and understanding between the militaries of two neighboring nations, we build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves. Some have said that war is too important to be left to the generals. Preventive defense says peace is too important to be left solely to the politicians.¹

-Dr. William Perry

Leaders inside the military as well as civilian leaders concerned with national and global defense have echoed Dr. Perry's statement about the importance of security assistance many times. Security assistance programs influence the behaviors of a wide array of potential adversaries and develop the capacity of allies and friendly nations to ensure regional stability. A particular aim of security assistance is to ensure access and interoperability, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or prosecute war on U.S. terms. The global security environment is constantly evolving. Consequently, security assistance planning must adapt to and when necessary reinforce changes in that environment.

In this paper, the author will explore the evolution of security assistance, its objectives, how those objectives should be met, and the risks involved. Lastly, this paper draws some conclusions and presents recommendations concerning the continuance of security assistance as a foreign policy tool.

Background

Examples of one nation supporting another during a time of conflict are found throughout the ages. In the United States, for example, it was the assistance given to the American revolutionary force by the government of France. Today security assistance (SA) is the term used to designate programs that have emerged over the past 50 years to assist in the implementation of the United States National Security Strategy by providing resources to foreign governments. Security assistance is carried out primarily through a joint effort between the Department of State which is the lead agency by law and the Department of Defense. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, authorize the Security Assistance program.² Our current National Security Strategy (NSS) asserts that American interests are best served by promoting freedom around the world and defeating tyranny. President Bush's NSS declares that; "We seek to create a balance of

power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better.”³ President Bush clearly pledges that we will “make use of every tool in our arsenal”⁴ to implement the NSS. Security Assistance is one such tool.

Prior to the United States entry into World War I, during a time of declared neutrality, specifically during 1914-1917, the United States became a large exporter of war material. The sale of arms and munitions to the allies during this timeframe exceeded \$2 billion, and in 1916 alone accounted for over \$1 billion. This export effort and the subsequent U.S. involvement in international arms trade became a significant topic of national debate for the next 15–20 years.⁵ The debate led to the creation of a Senate Munitions Investigating Committee chaired by Senator Nye of North Dakota and known as the Nye Committee. What resulted from the Nye Committee was the creation of a Munitions Control Board and increased government oversight of the arms industry. Perhaps the sale of arms and munitions prior to our involvement in World War I was not security assistance as we recognize it today but, from that point one could have successfully predicted that future sales of this nature would become part of our nation’s foreign policy discussion.

The real roots of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy intended to support U.S. national security interests rest in World War II, the 1941 wartime environment as well as in the 1947 peacetime environment. The Lend-Lease Program of 1941 would ultimately become the start of providing military equipment, in significant quantities, to foreign nations. The Lend-Lease Act permitted the President of the United States to “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government (whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States) any defense articles.”⁶ In a broadcast to the American public on December 17, 1940 Franklin D. Roosevelt said “the best immediate defense of the United States is the success of Great Britain in defending itself; and that, therefore, quite aside from our historic and current interest in the survival of democracy in the world as a whole, it is equally important, from a selfish point of view of American defense, that we should do everything to help the British Empire to defend itself.”⁷ This equipment was originally provided on a credit basis and not as a sales transaction. Lend–Lease equipment went to England, Russia, China, and in 1942, even Latin America received up to \$400 million. By the end of the war the costs for Lend–Lease were in the neighborhood of \$45 billion.⁸

The economic impact of World War II on Europe was profound. Industrial centers were destroyed, unemployment was high, and general living standards had been reduced notably,

making Europe vulnerable to communist subversion and infiltration. U.S. policy makers saw the rejuvenation of Europe's economy as vital to U.S. national security interests. In response to what they believed to be a clear threat to U.S. security interests the Truman administration initiated new policy. The aim of these initiatives was to return political and economic stability to key regions of the world, especially Europe. The first of these initiatives was President Truman's request of \$400 million for a program of military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey. In his address before Congress on March 12, 1947, while requesting aid for Greece and Turkey, President Truman declared that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."⁹ President Truman argued that if the U.S. failed to support the cause of the free people of the world, such failure would very likely endanger world peace and jeopardize the welfare of the U.S. Truman's speech came to be known as the Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine called for United States engagement throughout the world, to contain communism at its then current borders, and to militarily strengthen the nations of the free world. The guiding principle was that no country should be allowed to fall into communist hands without an effort to prevent such a loss. Via the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, we began using the United States Army as a means to introduce assistance. We created a Military Attaché and Assistance Group (MAAG) within each country and began providing military aid. To this day Greece and Turkey prevail as security assistance success stories. Thus, began the birth of the peacetime security assistance program and the beginning of security assistance as a foreign policy tool

Immediately following congressional passage of the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Truman administration began efforts to provide massive economic assistance to much of war-torn Europe. Secretary of State George C. Marshall set forth a plan during a speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947. He outlined the aid program as an effort to revive the global economy "so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."¹⁰ By adopting the Marshall Plan, the U.S. committed itself to supplying billions of dollars in support of a huge post-war economic recovery program. It also committed itself to a clear realization that what happens in Europe will ultimately have an effect on security posture of the U.S. The event that solidified that realization was the establishment of NATO on April 4, 1949. NATO was a logical extension of the effort to contain Soviet expansion and reinforce the economic restoration of Europe, which was the aim of the Marshall Plan. A parallel initiative was our decision to provide strength to the new collective defense system through a major program of military assistance. This program, created via the passage of the Mutual Defense

Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949, was significant legislation in terms of starting long-term, multi-nation, peacetime-based security assistance programs. First, it gave the U.S. authority to provide substantial military assistance to NATO countries, as well as Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. Second, it established the legal basis for the major security assistance program elements that exist to this day.

Security assistance should be analyzed in conjunction with American foreign policy. Every President beginning with Truman has considered security assistance an important means for furthering U.S. national interests. Security Assistance has been used to support a wide variety of policies including the Truman Doctrine and containment; rebuilding the defense of postwar Western Europe, Japan, and later South Korea; underwriting the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel; assisting Israel and Turkey during the 1990–1991 Gulf War; and sending aid to the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent states of the former Soviet Union.

For example, President Clinton's 1995 NSS specified the strategic value of security assistance:

Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy – through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries, and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere – in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.¹¹

Likewise, Clinton's "National Military Strategy, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement" (February 1995) presented the military strategy for achieving the goals of the President's National Security Strategy.

Our military force must perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. These three components of the strategy are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict preventions, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Accomplishing the concepts of overseas presence and power projection.¹²

A specific component of the strategy was peacetime engagement, described as,

....a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping.¹³

In 1997 the formal requirements of the plan increased when a "National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now – A Military Strategy for a New Era" was formulated to

support the “National Security Strategy for a New Century” and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which also specifies the usefulness of security assistance

....The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests. Our defense efforts help to promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in many key regions of the world. To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation.¹⁴

The current guidance for security assistance appears in the September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It identifies the need to “work with others to defuse regional conflicts.”¹⁵ No more recent NSS publication outlines the military’s strategy for support of current national objectives, but the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report articulates military requirements to conduct security assistance activities. It asserts, “a primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves as an important means for linking DOD’s strategic direction with those U.S. forces that train allies and friends. The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation.”¹⁶ National security is strengthened by sustaining an international system that is respectful of the rule of law and that contributes to peace through a network of alliances and friendships.

Traditionally, U.S. policy objectives are the ends in the ends, ways, and means strategic model. Regarding security assistance these ends have been to promote regional stability, to help friendly countries defend themselves against external and internal threats (deter aggression), to strengthen the economics of those nations, to support democratically-elected governments, to advance U.S. economic interests, to maintain cohesion of our alliances, and to encourage adoption, or at the very least, an understanding of American values, institutions, and policies. In recent years, due to the threat of terrorism within an ever-changing global society, policy objectives have expanded to include access and interoperability with friendly nations, building coalitions, and supporting the U.S industrial base of defense related goods and services.

The security assistance programs themselves are the ways used to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives mentioned in the paragraph above. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management lists six major components of the U.S security assistance programs:

1. FMS/FMCS – Foreign Military Sales/Foreign Military Construction Sales
2. FMF – Foreign Military Financing
3. DCS – Direct Commercial Sales
4. IMET – International Military Education and Training
5. ESF – Economic Support Fund
6. PKO – Peacekeeping Operations¹⁷

In their own way, each program provides opportunities to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example, the IMET program provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET facilitates the development of professional and personal relationships, which then provide U.S. access and influence to sectors of society that often, play a major role in supporting or transitioning to democratic governments. Created in 1976, IMET is often considered to be the traditional U.S. military training program. Funded through the foreign aid appropriations process, IMET is overseen by the State Department and implemented by the Defense Department. The fundamental principle behind the concept of IMET is to make a positive impact on the foreign individuals receiving the training. The idea is to make a relatively small investment in individuals that will lead to a greater return to the U.S. by enhancing the individual participant's ability to make a positive impact in their native countries. This investment in providing foreign students with exposure to the American military and its training may produce a small but immediate impact, as in forming the coalition during the first Iraq War. For example, according to the defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, "the requirement for international military students to know English during their U.S. training contributed significantly to improved communication during the war."¹⁸ On the other hand, the return on the investment could have a significant influence on a nation since individuals, who received training in the U.S., may assume greater responsibility or authority within their nation. The individual being trained, especially those who receive training in the U.S., are expected to gain insight into our democratic form of government and civilian control of the military. By exposing these foreign officers to the professional military environment of our service schools, our core ideals can take seed while building professional military-to-military contacts develop. Walt Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated during congressional testimony that "IMET is perhaps our most cost effective security assistance program."¹⁹ It is also important to note that IMET is

not limited to schoolhouse instruction but also includes orientation tours within the United States for key foreign officials and training by U.S. military teams inside the foreign country, known as MTT or TAFT.²⁰

The FMS program provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to promote U.S. national security by contributing to regional and global stability, by strengthening military support for democratically elected governments, and containing threats such as terrorism, narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking. These grants enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities, which in turn helps to build and strengthen multilateral coalitions that enable us and our friends to be increasingly interoperable.

The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) program helps support regional peace support operations. PKO enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations by improving our ability to operate with other nations. The program also helps build capabilities in countries seeking to participate in international peace support missions thereby sharing an international burden to restore and advance regional stability and peace. Increasingly, these countries are not just consumers of assistance but reliable contributors to our global security interests.²¹

Security assistance may be provided by money, people, materials, equipment services, facilities, time, knowledge, understanding, and planning. Approximately one-half of all U.S. foreign aid since 1946 has come through security assistance.²² Currently, the lion's share goes to Egypt and Israel. From the late 1970s through FY 1997, Israel annually received \$3 billion in security assistance: \$1.8 billion in military aid under the Foreign Military Financing program and \$1.2 billion from the Economic Support Fund. Egypt commonly received yearly about \$2.1 billion in security aid: \$1.3 billion in FMF and \$815 million in ESF.²³ It is not only money that makes the programs effective. Besides tangible resources like dollars spent and the number of individuals trained or sales made, there are the intangible resources such as support of the international customer, program guidance and oversight, knowledge imparted, planning, responsiveness to the needs of our friends and allies, and lastly, understanding of foreign customs and cultures.

Balance of Ends, Ways, and Means

Are security assistance ends, ways, and means currently in balance? If by balance we mean all parts being equal, then the answer is no. If by balance we mean an arrangement of parts or elements capable of success or ongoing effectiveness, then the answer is yes. It is all in one's perspective. There are aspects of security assistance that work and others that should

be re-evaluated. A good way to determine balance is to measure success. The fall of the Soviet Union is a good example of a major security assistance success story. Using security assistance to deter aggression and support containment, the U.S. was able to defeat communism in Central Asia, Europe, Turkey, and Egypt. There are many other success stories: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was supported by regional access granted to U.S. military forces. "U.S. defense officials had developed special relationships and U.S. forces were eminently familiar with both personnel and facilities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan due to a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises and consultative talks held every year in the region since 1996."²⁴ Because of training received via security assistance, Egypt was able to send a medical unit to Afghanistan in support of OEF. The Camp David Accords also led to massive amounts of U.S. security assistance. In essence, security assistance bought the U.S. government an "insurance" policy against a regional conflict and greatly increased prospects for a lasting regional peace. The Palestinian problem persists, but Egypt and Israel have not fought a war since the 1979 accords. There have been instances when security assistance has failed, and the risk of failure should always be considered.

Risks, Critiques of SA & Other Views

Shifting international alliances and governmental changes in nations having U.S. equipment can pose serious security concerns for us. At one time Iran was on the receiving end of one of the largest U.S. security assistance programs. Geographically located just south of the Soviet Union, Iran was considered a key part of the national security strategy of Soviet containment. Therefore, the U.S. Army placed advisers in Iran; the U.S. sold helicopters, ships, artillery, and missiles to Iran. All this ended in February 1979 when Iranians took U.S. hostages at the American Embassy in Tehran. To this day, the U.S. and Iran are still at diplomatic odds with each other.

There are also risks in specific programs under the security assistance umbrella. FMS is one example. The U.S. enjoys great technological advantages in weaponry. The FMS program reduces that advantage by allowing other nations to gain access to our technology. In addition, on occasion other nations have been equipped with newer, more advanced equipment than that in the hands of our own forces. It is problematic for U.S. forces to have equipment that can only achieve the latest capabilities through upgrades that must be purchased separately. Consider the M1A2 tank purchases by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the AH-64 (Apache) helicopter purchases by several²⁵ Gulf States, both of which were integrated with a faster Fire Control Electronics Unit (FCEU) and air-conditioning, which at the time were options not yet available to

our own soldiers. The sale of advanced equipment also poses the risk of losing the technology inherent in that equipment, moreover other nations are becoming very capable of exploiting technological advances, thereby depriving our defense industry of future business and adversely affecting our national economy.

Critics of security assistance claim the programs were initially “designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War and decolonization”²⁶ and have been amended in a piecemeal fashion, so different and even contradictory priorities, authorities, and instrumentalities are now being used to deliver security assistance. In 1988-1989, the House Foreign Affairs Committee took a bipartisan, in-depth look at foreign assistance and subsequently issued a report that declared “changes in the international environment and the position of the U.S... domestic budgetary pressures...and the loss of public and Congressional support for the aid program all demand major changes in foreign aid legislation. U.S. foreign assistance needs a new premise, a new framework, and a new purpose to meet the challenges of today.”²⁷ Over the years Congress has expressed several concerns about security assistance, including its negative impact on the U.S. balance of payments and its diversion of resources away from domestic priorities. Congress has been concerned that security assistance might entangle the U.S. in ill-considered commitments – a fear rooted in a conviction by some that U.S. aid to Saigon, beginning in the 1950s, contributed to the subsequent large-scale commitments of U.S. troops to South Vietnam in the 1960s. Then of course, there is Iran. Historians will probably always debate what happened there. Two other congressional concerns are that security assistance has, at times, assisted repressive undemocratic governments that abuse their citizens’ human rights and that it has been a cause of regional instability by contributing to arms races and military coups. For example, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of California have tried for years to end training programs for Indonesia, arguing that the U.S. should not be associated with that country’s poor human rights record or repressive military. Similar efforts by Representative Joe Moakly of Massachusetts call for closing the School of the Americas (SOA), because he discovered that some of its graduates were implicated in the rape and murder of four Catholic nuns in El Salvador in 1980. As more SOA alumni reached positions of authority in their respective countries not all the results were as positive as the IMET program goals envisioned.

The SOA has been a significant part of IMET and security assistance for Latin America for more than 50 years. Like many other aspects of current security assistance, the SOA can trace its beginning to actions from the World War II era. In the 1930s, German, Italian, and French military mission dominated the Latin American region. As a direct result of the 1936

Buenos Aires Inter-American Conference and the Declaration of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, Latin American countries began to cancel their arrangements with European countries and replace them similar arrangements and missions from the United States. With U.S. presence in place throughout the region by 1941 and the introduction of the Lend-Lease Act, it soon became very apparent that military training was needed.

Founded by the U.S. in 1946, the SOA was initially located in Panama. In 1984, the school relocated to Fort Benning, Georgia, as fallout of the Panama Canal Treaty. Since its inception, the school has trained Latin American military personnel in military skills and professional development designed to contribute to their countries internal defense and national development. The SOA is also committed to fostering and strengthening relationships between the U.S. and countries of the Western hemisphere. However, over the years the school has been the target of considerable denunciation and controversy as military authorities, who fail to respect the concept of civilian control of the military, have historically led many Latin American governments. The decade of the 1980's was an especially controversial time as the SOA was accused of fostering the continuation of military governments and human rights abuses. Critics of the School of the Americas say that it is a school for dictators. Representative Moakly (MA) said in a recent interview "Every time there's a heinous act, there's someone from the School of The Americas involved."²⁸ However, Louis W. Goodman, Dean of American University's School of International Service and an expert on civil-military relations, said the school's main purpose is military training, not human rights or democracy building. "It's an interoperability training school." To think it's a human rights training program is absurd -- you're teaching people to fly helicopters.²⁹ The accusations were not always true but the perception was the U.S. was expending security assistance funds to train and develop personnel who were later becoming leaders of the armed forces of their country and were wrongly using their power to combat domestic opposition. In other words, they were failing to implement democratic principles. Should the SOA be closed because some graduates have been accused of or committed human rights abuse? No. Since its inception over 50 years ago, the SOA has graduated more than 60,000 students from 21 Latin American countries. Less than one percent of those students were linked to human rights violations, and fewer still have had allegations substantiated against them.³⁰ Graduates who have committed human rights abuses are individually responsible for their actions. There has never been a link established between training received at the SOA and subsequent human rights abuses by graduates. Since a disturbing number of clergy have committed abuse against children, should our seminaries be closed? How can we hold a school accountable for the moral failure of its graduates? The

conduct of some graduates may tarnish an institutions reputation, but in this case, it is irresponsible to blame the institution. This would be like saying Harvard University is accountable for the actions of the Unabomber.³¹

Conclusion

Security assistance does not exist in a vacuum; it involves an intricate network of diplomatic, financial, political, and security issues. Security assistance is an important element of our security preparedness and ultimately our national security strategy depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Our interests are served better if we are not forced to act alone, and if our friends and allies possess the capability to defend themselves and their own interests which often coincide with, or at least complement, our own. Simply said, when our friends and allies are strong, we are strengthened. It is in our interest to help meet threats that could ultimately bring harm to us all. Security assistance promotes shared interests and shared values. Through security assistance programs, Americans, as well as our friends and allies, are engaging with governmental and non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, private companies, students, scientists, and many others. This engagement is helping to form a network of linkages between our society and their societies, a web of linkages and shared values strong enough to withstand the ups and down of bilateral relations in the long run. Even though we may not always agree on the method we are bound by a common cause, a secure global environment, and it is this shared value that security assistance continuously strives to build upon.

Officials involved in security assistance have to be prepared and be willing to re-evaluate and self-evaluate how they do business. The global environment is constantly changing, and these changes directly affect the U.S. national interest and subsequent policy. The United States has to stay engaged. Recommendations such as closing the School of Americas or terminating assistance because of issues like human rights or nuclear testing may not effectively serve U.S. foreign policy or security assistance goals. We must stay engaged in an effort to uphold human rights and promote understanding between military leaders in our hemisphere and around the world. In the 1990s, as part of a broad effort to protest Pakistan's attempts to build a nuclear bomb, the U.S. cancelled military training for Pakistan's officers. In doing this, we undermined our own efforts and were left without contacts in Pakistan's military leadership when the country admitted for the first time testing a nuclear weapon. Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesperson, told reporters at a September 2000 briefing "The whole purpose is engagement. You are either involved in a dialogue with the militaries of other

nations or you are not...Human beings react well to faces that they have seen before, people with whom they have had a conversation before. The old cliché about an emergency or crisis is not the best time to place that first phone call to a person with whom you've never had any relationship is absolutely true"³². Our current and future security is directly related to political and economic freedom around the world so the U.S. has a stake in the success of security assistance as a foreign policy tool. Security assistance is and should remain a key component of the U.S. government in the execution of our national security strategy. Our current policy allows many opportunities to engage other nations. We should stay the course.

Recommendations

Reliance on security assistance as a key component of our national security strategy is essential. Security assistance personnel must continue to promote programs that enhance military-to-military ties. The IMET program is a very effective, low-cost, high-gain program which must be retained and protected. The benefits gained through direct contact with foreign students will far outweigh the other elements of assistance in light of our future focus on democratization, human rights, and military support to civilian authorities. What we must not do is use IMET as a foreign policy sanction tool or as one article said "in short-range carrot and stick diplomacy."³³ IMET should be seen and employed as a long-term way for the military to develop contacts. Another recommendation is to pursue security assistance programs most intensively with those countries that rank highest among U.S. interests. For example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and now Iraq because of their possession of significant petroleum reserves and because of their proximity to Iran and Syria, should benefit from a more expansive security assistance relationship than a country such as Ecuador. The U.S. should still engage countries like Ecuador but the level of engagement would be modest compared to that of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Security assistance FMS programs should no longer provide advance defense systems and services to less developed countries with questionable regimes, but instead focus on ensuring that our principle allies and coalition partners, those who share the burden, have the advanced capabilities they need to prevail. The future does not lie in maximizing sales of defense systems to all willing buyers but rather in focusing on our coalition partners and collaborating with them and the defense industry, to build systems that will achieve interoperability in the field. The challenge is to continue to be innovative and apply new ideas. The security assistance community must be vigilant for opportunities to continue to upgrade the structure and be responsive to the opportunities, the changing global environment offers us.

Endnotes

¹ Dr. William J. Perry remarks, "Fulfilling the Role of Preventive Defense," published in *Reading in War, National Policy and Strategy*, Vol. 5 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, PA. 1988), 112.

² Ernest Graves, *U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process* (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1998), 42.

³ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

⁴ Ibid.,

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